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New York City. Since the authorized inspections "do nothing
more than enable police to ferret out crime," ' 12 06 he would have
suppressed evidence resulting from these searches. He amply
documented New York's "long tradition of interpreting our State
Constitution to protect individual rights." ' 1207 Additionally, he
stated his view that the appellate division could engage in constitutional analysis which might expand individual rights under the
state constitution. He believes that this is often necessary and
should be performed because for most cases in New York, the
appellate division becomes the court of last resort for the parties.
THIRD DEPARTMENT
12 08
People v. Scott

(decided January 31, 1991)
Just prior to printing, this case was reversed by the New York Court of
12 10
Appeals 12 0 9 which concluded that the rule in Oliver v. United States
"does not adequately protect fundamental constitutional rights.," 12 1 1 Under
Oliver, "in areas outside the curtilage, an owner of 'open fields' enjoys no
Fourth Amendment protection." 12 12 The court claimed that "under the law of
this State the citizens are entitled to more protection," 1 2 13 and held that
"where landowners fence or post 'No Trespassing signs on their private
property . . . or. . . indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the
expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and . . . free from
12 14
unwanted intrusions is reasonable."

A criminal defendant alleged that his right to be protected
1206. Id. at 185, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (Harwood, J., dissenting).
1207. Id. at 188, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (citing People v. P.J. Video, 68
N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986)).
1208. 169 A.D.2d 1023, 565 N.Y.S.2d 576 (3d Dep't 1991), rev'd, People
v. Scott; People v. Keta, Nos. 6, 27, 1992 WL 62774 (N.Y. Apr. 2, 1992).
1209. People v. Scott; People v. Keta, Nos. 6, 27, 1992 WL 62774 (N.Y.
Apr. 2, 1992).
1210. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
1211. People v. Scott, 1992 WL 62774.
1212. Id.
1213. Id. at 6.
1214. Id. at 9.
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against illegal searches and seizures under both the state 12 15 and

federal 12 16 constitutions was violated. The defendant argued that
the posting of "no trespassing" signs around his property, which
consisted of 165 acres of rural fields, evinced a clear expectation
of privacy. Thus, the defendant contended that the physical
invasion of his property by an informant and a police officer in
order to observe the cultivation of marihuana constituted an
illegal trespass. Therefore, the defendant argued that the police's
subsequent seizure of the marihuana, effected pursuant to a
warrant, should have been suppressed.
The court held that the defendant's posting of no trespassing
signs about his property did not entitle him to invoke his right to
privacy.1217 The court noted that the "open fields" doctrine 1 2 18
denied the defendant any legitimate expectation of privacy. The
court concluded that because the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy, "the search warrant was not obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional right of privacy or of his
search and seizure rights. ' ' 12 19 Therefore, the marihuana seized
pursuant to the warrant was properly admitted.
In the fall of 1987, a hunter, Collar, while in pursuit of a
wounded deer, came onto defendant's land. Once there, Collar
observed what he thought was an area where marihuana was being cultivated. Collar observed, inter alia, a pond dug out in a
hillside, two plastic 50-gallon drums, camouflage netting, beaten
paths and plots of various sizes. Collar also observed no trespassing signs surrounding the property that bore the defendant's
name. 1220

In late July, 1988, Collar again entered upon the defendant's
1215. N.Y. CONST. art. I,

§ 12.

1216. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1217. Scott, 169 A.D.2d at 1025, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 577.

1218. The open fields doctrine permits the police to enter a field without a
search warrant. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (special
protection accorded by fourth amendment not extended to open fields); Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (the Court concluded that the
"government's intrusion upon open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable
searches' proscribed by the fourth amendment.").
1219. Scott, 169 A.D.2d at 1026, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
1220. Id. at 1024, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
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land. This time he observed approximately fifty marihuana
plants, some of which had a plastic hose running to them from
the pond. Collar also observed a man nearby who had a gun
strapped to his shoulder. Shortly thereafter, Collar relayed this
information to the state police. The police requested that Collar
return to the defendant's field and obtain a leaf from a marihuana
plant. 1221

On August 22, 1988, Collar gave in camera testimony in
county court regarding his observations. Later that same day,
state police investigator Hyman accompanied Collar to the defendant's property and entered the land and observed the marihuana.

The next day Hyman applied to the county court for a search
warrant. 12 22 The warrant was issued and executed later that afternoon. The police recovered approximately 200 portable marl1221. The court rejected the defendant's claim that Collar was acting as a
police agent when he reentered the property at the direction of the police. Id.
The court stated that the point was irrelevant because the open fields doctrine
denied the defendant an expectation of privacy. See also People v. Abbott, 105
A.D.2d 1029, 1031, 483 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (3d Dep't 1984) ("whether the
police officers were technically guilty of trespass is inconsequential").
In United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982), the court listed two
critical factors to consider when analyzing whether a person was acting as an
'instrument or agent' of the police: "(1) whether the government knew of and
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the
search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or further his own ends."
Miller, 688 F.2d at 657. In United States v. Bazan, 807 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987), the court applied these factors and
concluded that the record failed to establish whether an individual who
trespassed on his neighbor's property looking for illicit drug activities was an
agent. Bazan, 807 F.2d at 1203. However, the court intimated that had the
police "kn[own] of or acquiesced in the intrusive conduct," the individual
would have been considered a police agent. Bazan, 807 F.2d at 1203.
However, even if the individual is found to be a police agent, Oliver intimates
that this would not cause a fourth amendment problem. The Oliver Court
stated that "in the case of open fields, the general rights of property protected
by the common law of trespass have little or no relation to the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183-84.
1222. Hyman's application was based on the following: Collar's in camera
testimony; an anonymous telephone call to the sheriff's department; Hyman's
personal observations; and tax maps which showed the defendant as the owner
of the property in question. Scott, 169 A.D.2d at 1025, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
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huana plants and other items related to its cultivation.
The defendant was arrested and pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree. At the time of his arrest,
and after being advised of his rights, the defendant admitted that
he owned the land and grew the marihuana plants. Furthermore,
the defendant claimed to have resided in a rundown mobile home
on the property1 2 23 for the past fifteen months. A storage shed
was the only other structure on the property. 1224
The third department, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the
judgment against the defendant. The court noted that the United
States Supreme Court addressed this same issue in Oliver v.
United States. 1225 In Oliver, the defendant planted marihuana on
his secluded land and erected fences and no trespassing signs
around it. 12 26 The Court concluded that "[n]either of these
suppositions demonstrate[d] . . .that the expectation of privacy

was legitimate in the sense required by the Fourth
Amendment." ' 1227 The Oliver court stated that the proper
"inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment[,] ' ' 12 28 and "not whether the individual chooses to
12 29
conceal assertedly 'private' activity."
The Scott court stated that the open fields doctrine enunciated
in Oliver is followed in New York. 123 0 In applying the doctrine
1223. The marihuana grown in the open field was not within the "curtilage"
of the mobile home. Id.Curtilage is described as "the land or grounds
surrounding the dwelling, which are necessary and convenient and habitually
used for family purposes and carrying on domestic employment." BLACKS
LAW DICTIONARY 348 (6th ed. 1990). At common law, this area is considered

part of the home itself for fourth amendment purposes. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at
180. The Oliver Court noted that the common law distinguished "open fields"
from "curtilage" and concluded that "th[is] distinction implies that only the
curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment
protections that attach to the home." Id.
1224. Scott, 169 A.D.2d at 1024, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
1225. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
1226. Id. at 182.
1227. Id.
1228. Id. at 182-83.

1229. Id. at 182.
1230. Scott, 169 A.D.2d at 1025, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 577; see also People v.
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to the facts at bar, the court concluded that the defendant had no
legitimate expectation of privacy as "[tihe marihuana in question
here was clearly grown in an open, uncultivated field away from
the curtilage of any residential structure .... ",1231
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that Collar
was acting as an agent of the police when he reentered the defendant's land at their direction and that "this constituted an illegal
trespass by the police." ' 12 32 Because the defendant had no
expectation of privacy, the court reasoned that the "search
warrant was not obtained in violation of the defendant's
constitutional right[s]." ' 12 33 Thus, it was "irrelevant whether
12 3 4
Collar was acting as a police agent.,,
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the open
fields doctrine in Hester v. United States. 12 35 In Hester, the
Court stated that "[tihe special protection accorded by the Fourth
Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and
effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction beReynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 556, 523 N.E.2d 291, 292, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16
(1988) ("[N]either the erection of fences nor the posting of 'No Trespassing'

signs on otherwise open land will establish a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the sense required by the Fourth Amendment."); People v. Joeger, 111
A.D.2d 944, 945, 490 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42-43 (3d Dep't 1985) ("The Oliver
ruling was recently followed by this court in a case factually similar to the
instant matter

. .

. [and] [w]e see no reason to alter that holding here.");

People v. Fillhart, 93 Misc. 2d 911, 913, 403 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (County Ct.
Jefferson County 1978) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment... does not extend...
protection to the individual when he grows a prohibited product in an open
field.").
1231. Scott, 169 A.D.2d at 1025, 565 N.Y.S. at 577.
1232. Id.
1233. Id. at 1026, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 557. See also Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d at
557, 523 N.E.2d at 293, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 17 ("[Cjonduct and activity which
is readily open to public view is not protected . . . . Consequently, the
warrantless observations of marihuana on defendant's property provided

probable cause for the issuance of [a] search warrant.").
1234. Scott, 169 A.D.2d at 1026, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 578. See also Abbott,
105 A.D.2d at 1031, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 453 ("Whether the police officers were
technically guilty of a trespass is inconsequential.")
1235. 265 U.S. 57 (1924), overruled by Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
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tween the latter and the house is as old as the common law." 1236
The Court distinguished the open fields from the curtilage 1237
and stated that no legitimate expectation of privacy attached to
open fields.1238 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
government's intrusion upon the open fields did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 1239
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Hester in United
States v. Oliver.12 40 In Oliver, the Court stated that "open fields
do not provide a setting for those intimate activities that the
[Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance." 124 1 The majority concluded that "the
text of the Fourth Amendment and . . . the historical and contemporary... understanding of its purposes, ... [does not cre-

ate a] legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free
from warrantless intrusion by government officers."

1242

FOURTHDEPARTMENT
24 3
People v. Caruso1

(decided June 7, 1991)

A criminal defendant alleged that his right to be protected
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the state 1244 and
federal 1245 constitutions was violated when police officers,
1236. Id. at 59.
1237. In defining the extent of the home's curtilage, the Court looks at four
factors:

[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the
nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
1238. See Hester, 265 U.S. at 258.
1239. Id. at 259.
1240. 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).

1241. Id. at 179.
1242. Id. at 181.
1243. 572 N.Y.S.2d 216 (4th Dep't 1991).
1244. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.

1245. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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